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HE TOPIC I have chosen to discuss with you this
afternoon concerns the relation between monetarypol-
icy developments over the past few decades and the
U. S. Government debt. The point emphasized will be
how the Federal Reserve’s response to deficits in the
Federal budgets is related to the growing inflationary
trend experienced in recent years.
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Before getting into what I want to say, it is neces-
saw to introduce an analytical concept we at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis find very useful. In
order to summarize in a single series the net influence
of all of the monetary actions of both the Treasury and
the Federal Reserve, we employ a concept referred
to as the “monetary base”. The monetary base repre-
sents the net monetary liabilities of the Government1
held by the public.2 The monetary base has been re-
ferred to as “high powered” money because it can be
used as reserves by commercial banks to expand de-
mand deposits by more than the amount of their
reserves.
The approach our staff uses to analyze the factors
influencing the growth of the nation’s money stock
demand deposits plus currency in the hands of the
1U S. Treasury and Federal Reserve System.
2
Cornmereial banks and nonbank public.
public — holds that the monetary base is the major
determinant of changes in the rate of growth of the
money stock. As the fourth and fifth tiers on the chart
illustrate, the growth rates of the monetary base and
the money •stock over periods of several years are
very similar. The primary reason that money grew
somewhat slower on average than the base in the
early 1960’s is that this was a period of very rapid
growth of time deposits at commercial banks, espe-
cially large negotiable CDs. Growth in time deposits
absorbs reserves, or base money, leaving less available
to support the growth of the narrowly defined money
stock.
Since our analysis holds that growth in the base
determines the growth in money, we want to look at
the factors causing the growth of the monetary base.
During the past twenty years, growth of the mone-
tary base has been determined primarily by two
sources — the gold stock and Federal Reserve credit,
An increase in the dollar amount of either of these
sources, other things equal, increases the monetary
base by an equal amount.
In September 1949, when the gold stock source of
the base was at its peak, it comprised almost 58 per-
cent of the monetary base. From 1949 to 1968 the
amount of gold owned by the U. S. Treasury declined
almost continuously. This decline in gold stock con-
tributed a negative influence on the growth of the
base, while increases in Federal Reserve holdings of
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U. S. Government securities contributed a positive in-
fluence. Other sources, though their net influence has
been positive, have contributed relatively little to
movements in the base during the past twenty years.
From 1952 to the middle of 1961 the monetary base
grew slowly as increases in securities held by the Fed-
eral Reserve System largely offset decreases in the
gold stock. Beginning in the 1960s, increases in Fed-
eral Reserve holdings of Government securities ex-
ceeded reductions in the gold stock, and the monetary
base grew more rapidly. A two-tiered gold system,
established in March 1968, separated the gold m’arket
into private and official sectors, each with its own
price, and changes in official gold holdings came to a
virtual standstill. From April 1968 through 1971, the
gold stock remained roughly constant and contrib-
uted little to changes in the monetary base.
At the end of 1971 and again in 1973, the U. S.
Government changed the official dollar price of gold
— an event commonly referred to as a devaluation.
These two devaluations, by themselves, added about
$2 billion to the monetary base, since the book value
of the gold held by the Government was raised.3
Holdings of Government securities by the Federal
Reserve represent the System’s acquisitions of Federal
Government debt through its open market opera-
tions. These security holdings presently comprise 76
percent of the monetary base, and since the early
1960s changes in security holdings have been the
dominant influence on the growth of the base. Through
purchases and sales of securities, called open market
operations, ‘the Federal Reserve can control the
growth of the monetary base by offsetting or com-
plementing any movements in other sources.
Growth of Government securities held by the Fed-
eral Reserve System depends on both the growth of
Government debt outstanding, and the percent of
this debt the System decides to purchase. Let’s now
trace the growth of Government debt over the last
twenty years, the acquisition of debt by the Federal





Government debt is shown in the top tier of the
chart. The trend growth of Government debt out-
standing oscillated around a one percent annual rate
3
Albert E, Burger, “The Monetary Economics of Gold,” this
Review (January 1974).
from the first quarter of 1952 to the third quarter of
1961. Unified budget deficits of $3.4 billion and $7.1
billion in fiscal years 1961 and 1962, respectively, ini-
tiated an increase in the trend rate in the early 1960s.
From the third quarter of 1961 to the fourth quarter
of 1966, net Government debt rose by $20 billion, an
average of about $38 billion per year, or at an annual
trend rate of 1.5 percent.4
Large unified budget deficits of $8.7 billion and
over $25 billion were incurred in fiscal years 1967 and
1968, respectively. These deficits further increased the
trend growth rate of Government debt. From the
fourth quarter of 1986 to the fourth quarter of 1970
net Government debt grew by over $28 billion, an
average of over $7 ‘billion per year, or at a 2.6 percent
annual rate.
Federal Government debt held by the Federal Re-
serve System (shown in the second tier of the chart)
rose by only about $0.5 billion per year from 1952
to 1961, but then began to rise more rapidly in the
1960s, Changes in the monetary base during the 1960s
roughly paralleled that of the System’s holding of
debt. The percent of debt held by the Federal Reserve
System is shown on the third panel of the chart.
Between the first quarter of 1952 and the third
quarter of 1961, the proportion of Government debt
held by the Federal Reserve System remained roughly
T
Net Federal Government Debt is total gross public debt
minus debt held by U. S. Government agencies and trust
funds.
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constant at around 11 percent. As net Government
debt increased, securities held by the Federal Re-
serve System increased proportionally, and as the debt
decreased, securities held decreased in the same way.
Variations in Government debt outstanding in the
1950s, especially late in the decade, were associated
with accelerations and decelerations in growth of the
monetary base. Variations in the base, in turn, were
a major cause of fluctuations in the money stock.
As the trend rate of growth of Government debt in-
creased in the first half of the 1960s, the percent of
the debt held by the Federal Reserve also increased.
The rate of acquisition of debt by the Federal Reserve
was more rapid than the expansion of Government
debt itself. Increased purchases of Governmentsecuri-
ties by the Federal Reserve direcfly increased the
monetary base, increasing its trend rate of growth,
which in turn increased growth of the money stock
and economic activity. As resource utilization ap-
proached its upper limit, as defined by potential out-
put, the rate of inflation increased.
Before looking at the developments in the late
1960s ‘and early 1970s, I want to digress a moment
and discuss with you what I would consider to be
the appropriate relation between a central bank’s hold-
ings of Government debt and the growth of Govern.
ment debt outstanding. If the net amount of public
debt were roughly constant or declining — that is,
Government budgets were in balance or surplus —
then the percent of the debt held by the Federal
Reserve B’anks would gradually rise as the level of
System holdings gradually rose. This assumes that
there are no major changes in other factors such as the
gold stock or reserve requirements of member banks.
I believe that monetary policy actions can and
should be geared to providing a relatively steady,
non-inflationary trend growth in the money stock. If
this were the case, the rate at which Government debt
is acquired by the central bank would not be influ-
enced by the size of the budgetary deficits or sur-
pluses. Therefore, one would expect that when there
are large budget deficits and the outstanding Govern-
ment debt is rising at a rapid rate, the proportion of
the debt owned by the central bank would decline.
This has not been the case for most of the post-War
period.
In contrast to the relation between the Government
debt and the central bank holdings that I would like
to ‘see, we have had a situation where the monetary
authorities have been principally concerned with the
general level of and trend of market interest rates,
rather than the growth of the nation’s money stock.
The experience has been that larger deficits have
tended to be accompanied by more than proportional
debt acquisition by the Federal Reserve Banks. The
behavioral sequence is familiar to most market ob-
servers. During periods when deficits are large, up-
ward pressure on market interest rates — downward
pressure on security prices — occurs at the time the
Treasury financings take place. In the past the Fed-
eral Reserve often has “even-keeled” the money mar-
kets — that is, provided reserves through open market
operations to “lean against” the tendency for interest
rates to rise in the short run.
In theory, the Federal Reserve would “unwind”
after the even-keel operation by reducing its portfolio
of securities. In practice, the desire to resist upward
pressure on market interest rates, especially during
periods of a strengthening economy and rising de-
mands for credit, has militated against behaving ac-
cording to this ideal. Also, during past fiscal years of
very large budget deficits, the Treasury has been in-
volved in some sort of financing the majority of the
time, which has left the monetary authorities little
opportunity to “unwind.”
Now let us return to a discussion of the develop-
ments from 1969 to the present. In 1969 the net stock
of outstanding U. S. Government debt declined as the
Federal budget moved into surplus for a while. This
was the result ‘of the ‘so-called “fiscal package” of
mid-1968 — which consisted of a 10 percent surcharge
on personal and corporate income taxes and a ceiling
on the growth of Federal ‘expenditures. The amount
of debt held by the Federal Reserve leveled off in
1969, ‘and we experienced a fairly sharp contraction
in the growth rates of the monetary base and the
money stock. These developments gave us a period
of significant monetary restraint, and the ensuing 1970
recession was the consequence.
Since early in 1970 the Federal budget deficits have
been sizable, as is shown by the rise in the outstanding
debt in the top tier of the chart’. In the past three
years we have seen a rise in the debt of over $16 bil-
lion per year, or at over a 5 percent annual rate of
increase. This adds up to a rise of over $49 billion.
In the same period the debt held by the Federal
Reserve Banks has risen over $17 billion, an average
increase of $5.8 billion per year.
These developments have fostered a rise in the
monetary base of almost $23 billion, or an increase of
7.7 percent per year since 1970. Similarly, the na-
tion’s money stock rose at a 6.7 percent average rate
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during these three years. In this period we have
experienced the fastest rates of increase in the money
stock and the monetary base since World War II, and
I would submit that the correlation between big Gov-
ernment deficits and rapid increases in the money
stock in recent years, as was true during the second
World War, are high enough to impress even the
most casual of monetary observers.
Having presented my view of the relation between
Government deficits and monetary growth, let me turn
to what I see as being the consequences. I draw your
attention to the lower two tiers on the chart, the
money stock and the general price index. Through
much of the economic history of this country as well
as others for which data are available, the general
relation between monetary growth and the price index
has shown that the rate of inflation reflects the aver-
age rate of growth of the money stock over the prior
two or more years.
The lower two tiers on the chart depict this rela-
tionship. The average rate of money stock growth
of less than 2 percent from 1952 to 1962 was ac-
companied by an average rise in prices at less than
a2percent rate through 1965. After money growth
accelerated to a 3.4 percent average rate from 1961
through 1966, the average rate of increase in the gen-
eral price index accelerated to 3.7 percent from the
end of 1965 to early 1969.
Following the period of monetary restraint in the
last half of 1966, the average rate of money growth
accelerated further to a6percent rate for the next
four years. With the usual lag, the rate of inflation
began to accelerate, and on balance during the pe-
riod early-1969 to mid-1971, prior to the wage—price
freeze, we experienced a rise in prices at a rate of 5.4
percent. During the three years since the end of the
1970 recession, money growth has avenged 6.7 per-
cent per year. During Phases I and II of the price-
wage control program, the average rise in prices was
only 3 percent, but with the very sharp increases
since the end of Phase II early last year, in the past
five quarters the general price index has risen at an
8 percent average annual rate.
In view of this acceleration in inflation and the
popular notion of a “trade-oW’ between inflation and
unemployment, let’s look at what we h’ave gained. In
the decade 1952 to 1962 average real output growth
was 3 percent per year, unemployment averaged 4.4
percent, and the general price index rose at less than
a 2 percent average annual rate. Then from 1962
through 1969, with the huge defense expenditure of
Vietnam, output growth averaged 4.6 percent per
year, unemployment again averaged 4.4 percent, and
the rate of inflation doubled from less than 2 percent
before 1966 to almost 4 percent over the next few
years.
In the last period under review, 1969 through 1973,
the average growth in output was only 3.6 percent,
about the same as from 1952 to 1962. Also, in the
recent period we experienced an average unemploy-
ment rate of 5 percent, slightly higher than the 1952-
1962 period. However, the past few years have seen
accelerating inflation, without significant benefits in
terms of more output or less unemployment.
Let me now try to summarize my view of the rela-
tion that has existed between Government deficits,
monetary growth, and inflation over the past twenty
or more years. In the decade 1952 until the latter part
of 1961, the net Government debt rose by a total of
about $22 billion. Of that amount, the Federal Re-
serve System, through its open market operations,
purchased and therefore “monetized,” about $5 billion.
This acquisition of Government debt by the central
bank was the primary factor causing a rise in the
monetary base of about $7.5 billion — a growth rate
of only 1.5 percent per year. The relatively slow
growth of Government debt, debt owned by the Fed-
eral Reserve, and the monetary base produced a
growth of our money stock of only $23 billion over
a decade, or a rise of less than 2 percent per year.
That is why prices rose so slowly through the 1950s
and into the early l960s.
Beginning in the early 1%Os, first with the in-
creased emphasis of economic policies on stimulating
real growth and achieving lower unemployment rates,
followed by the massive Federal expenditures associ-
ated with Vietnam, net outstanding Government debt
rose by about $48 billion from late 1961 to late 1970.
In this period, the Federal Reserve System purchased
in the open market about $33 billion of Government
debt, producing a rise in the monetary base of over
$29 billion, and a rise in the money stock of over $73
billion in roughly 9 years. I assert that this was the
original economic policy development underlying our
current troubles. More recently, in only three years,
Government debt has risen another $49 billion, the
Federal Reserve has purchased over $17 billion, giv-
ing us a rise in the monetary base of over $20 billion
and a $48 billion increase in ‘the money stock. Com-
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bining the periods since 1961, in the past twelve years
the Federal Reserve has acquired over one-half of the
almost $100 billion increase in the net national debt,
contributing to almost a doubling of our money sup-
ply, or in actual dollar terms a $120 billion increase.
In my view, the successive upward ratcheting in
the average growth rate of the money stock has been
the primary cause of the acceleration in the average
rate of inflation. Id onot accept the analyses which
point to the food price increases, the petroleum prod-
uct price increases, or other special factors as causes
of the underlying inflationary trend. Certainly these
factors influenced the timing and possibly the magni-
bide of the recent sharp increases in the price indexes;
but ‘a rise in the price of any single commodity does
not cause inflation any more than a fall in the price of
a single commodity causes deflation. No one is arguing
that the recent declines in prices of a number of
agricultural commodities indicate we are experiencing
deflation.
Finally, let me turn to the outlook. My staff tells
me that by mid-year the average rate of increase in
the money stock will have been at 7 percent for
three and one-half years. Past experience would in-
dicate that if this rate of money growth were main-
tained, we would expect also to observe an average
inflation rate of about 7 percent to persist. Thus, our
analysis holds that an essential step towards bringing
inflation down to more tolerable rates is to reduce the
average growth of money. Specifically, I would like to
see no more than a 5 percent rate of money growth
in the second half of this year, and then possibly re-
duce it somewhat further next year. This approach
would not bring an early end to inflation, but it would
be tangible progress without necessarily involving the
hardships associated with a recession.
However, although I believe the desirability of
achieving lower average money growth is clear, there
are reasonsto be less than optimistic that it will occur.
The Federal budget for fiscal 1975, which begins in
just two months, implies a deficit of about $9 billion,
and many private analysts speculate that it could be
much larger than that. Current estimates are for very
sizable Treasury borrowing in the second half of this
calendar year. Since we are already faced with a
quite high strncture of market interest rates and pros-
pects for a strengthening economy, the temptation
may be great to repeat the ways of the past and add
substantial quantities of securities to the System port-
folio through open market operations. If that were
done, then the pattern I have outlined to you would
be repeated — increases in outstanding Government
debt matched by increased holdings of debt by the
central bank, which means continued rapid growth
of the monetary base and the money stock. That
would mean continued rapid inflation.
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